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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-~------------------~---~~-~~~ 
BRUCE MICHAEL LARNER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
MARY LYNN HILL, formerly, 
MARY LYNN LARNER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 18065 
In the action below the Third Judicial District-
Court in and for Salt Lake County was requested to grant 
full faith and credit to a Colorado court decree of dissolution 
of marriage and to then modify that decree, and grant custody 
of three minor children to the Plaintiff. The Defendant-
Appellant objected to the jurisdiction of the Salt Lake 
County District Court; the Court overruled that objection. 
The Defendant-Appellant petitioned this Court for 
an interlocutory appeal. That petition was granted to 
-1-
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consider whether the Third Judicial District Court has 
jurisdiction to modify the Colorado decree with regard to 
child custody. 
II. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, the Hon. Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., judge presiding, 
overruled the Defendant-Appellant's Motion to Object to 
Jurisdiction, granted full faith and credit to the Colorado 
Decree of Dissolution, granted temporary custody of two of 
the ~hree minor children to the Plaintiff and ruled that the 
Utah Court had the jurisdiction to modify the Colorado 
decree with regard to the custody of only the two minor 
children who had been residing in Utah for more than one 
year. 
III. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff-Respondent requests this Court to 
affirm the decision of the Court below taking jurisdiction 
over two of the minor children and remand the case for a 
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hearing on the merits of Plaintiff's petition to modify the 
Colorado Decree. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff and the Defendant were divorced ~n 
Colorado in March 1980 with joint custody of three minor 
children being granted the parties. Originally under the-· 
decree, physical custody of two of the chilren, Stephen 
Michael and Joseph Scott was granted to the Defendant, 
living in Colorado, and physical custody of the daughter, 
.Julianne Michelle was granted to the Plaintiff living in 
- Utah. By oral agreement of the parties, the child Stephen 
_moved to Utah from Colorado in 1980 and lived in the Plainti£f's 
·home for approximately one year prior to the filing. of the 
Plaintiff's complaint to modify the Colorado decree. 
In July 1981 the Plaintiff filed a Complaint in 
the Third Judicial District Court seeking a Modification of 
the Colorado decree to grant full custody of all three minor 
children to him. The Defendant was served with that Complaint 
in Colorado, and through Salt Lake counsel filed a Special 
Appearance and a Motion to Object to Jurisdiction contesting 
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the jurisdiction of the Utah court to modify the decree. 
Plaintiff's counsel filed a Motion for Temporary 
Order asking for an Order granting temporary custody of the 
three minor children to the Plaintiff pending a full hearing 
and resolution of the case on its merits. That motion, 
and notice of the hearing, was served upon the Defendant's 
Utah counsel by mail and was heard by the Court, the Hon. 
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., presiding, on August 25, 1981. An 
Order was entered October 1, 1981 granting full faith and 
credit to the Colorado decree and granting temporary full 
custody of two of the minor children, Stephen Michael and 
Julianne Michelle, to the Plaintiff and ruling that ''in all 
other respects the Colorado Decree shall remain in full 
force and effect ... " The third child was left in the 
custody of the mother and returned to Colorado. 
On October 1, 1981, at the request of the Plaintiff's 
counsel, the Motion of the Defendant to Object to Jurisdiction 
was heard by the Court, the Hon. Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. 
presiding. The Court overruled that Motion and entered an 
Order on October 16, 1981 to that effect and directiug that 
a custody evaluation be performed. 
The Defendant appeals from the Orders of the Court 
temporarily granting full custody of two of the minor children 
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to the Plaintiff and denying the Defendant's objection to 
jurisdiction. 
v. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No oral evidence was presented to the Court at 
either of the hearings on August 25, 1981 or October l, 
19.81. Prior to the Court's ruling, the Defendant-submitted 
_ no evidence as to the facts of the case or facts regarding 
the Defendant's objection to jurisdiction. The only evidence 
bef_or_e the Court was that presented by the verified Complaint 
of the Plaintiff dated July 1, 1981 with the attached Colorado 
Decree (T.R. pp 2=17). Based upon that verified Complaint 
the following are the uncontroverted facts upon which the 
Court entered its Orders. 
The Plaintiff, Bruce Larner, is a resident of Salt 
Lake County and the State of Utah. The Defendant, Mary Lynn 
Hill formerly Mary Lynn Larner, is a resident of the State 
of Colorado. (T.R. p. 2) 
The Piaintif f and the Defendant were formerly 
husband and wife. The parties were divorced pursuant to a 
Decree of Dissolution of Marriage entered on March 17, 1980 
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by the District Court in and for the County of Jefferson and 
the State of Colorado, Civil Action No. 79 DR 2067. (T.R. 
p. 2) 
The Plaintiff and the Defendant are the parents of 
three minor children: Stephen Michael Larner, born March 
13, 1968; Julianne Michelle Larner, bo~rri May 10, 1969; and 
Joseph Scott Larner, born May 29, 1972. (T.R. p. 2) 
Pursuant to the Decree of Dissolution, the parties 
exercised joint custody over their minor children since the 
entry of the Decree. The parties initially agreed that 
physical care, custody and control of Stephen Michael Larner 
and Joseph Scott Larner was to be granted to the Defendant 
herein, and that physical care, custody and control of 
Julianne Michelle Larner was to be granted to the Plaintiff 
herein. (T.R. pp. 2-3) 
The parties agreed in July, 1980 that physical 
care, custody and control of the minor child Stephen Michael 
Larner would be transferred to the Plaintiff. Since July, 
1980 said minor child has resided with the Plaintiff in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. 
All three minor children were, in July 1981. 
residing with the Plaintiff Bruce Michael Larner in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. (T.R. p. 3) The child Joseph Scott was 
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then domiciled in Colorado; the other two were domiciled in 
Utah. 
The Defendant Mary Lynn Hill was in the near 
future going to move from Colorado to the mid-West, and 
therefore there would be problems resulting from the separation 
of the children and problems with regard to visitation 
between the parties and the minor children. (T.R. p. 3) 
Since the divorce of the parties, the Plaintiff 
herein had re-married and had established a home and residence 
in Salt Lake City, Utah such that he could adequately and 
fully care for all three minor children of the parties. The 
Plaintiff's current spouse was willing, able and anxious to 
assist the Plaintiff in caring for and assuming full custody 
of the three minor children of the Plaintiff. (T.R. p. 3) 
Plaintiff alleged that in order for the three 
minor children to grow and develop as a family unit and to 
relate and interact with each other, it was in the best 
interest of the children that they not be separated and 
reside in far distant different states, but tha.t physical 
custody of all three children be placed with the Plaintiff. 
He alleged it was reasonable that visitation as set forth in 
the Decree of Dissolution be maintained and continued such 
that the children could maintain an appropriate relationship 
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with their mother. (T.R. p. 3) 
In order to stabilize the situation during the 
pendency of the action, the Plaintiff alleged it was reasonable 
that the Court enter a temporary order granting full temporary 
custody of all three minor children to the Plaintiff until 
such time as the trial Court could hear and rule upon the 
Complaint and petition for modification. (T.R. p. 4) 
There had been a substantial change of circumstances 
such that it was appropriate at that time that the Colorado 
Decree of Dissolution of Marriage should be modified to 
grant full custody, care and control of the minor children 
to the Plaintiff, terminating any obligation of the Plaintiff 
to pay child support and granting the Defendant visitation 
rights as set forth in the original Decree. (T.R. p. 4) 
The Colorado Decree of Dissolution contained the 
following pertinent provisions with regard to child custody 
and visitation: 
Due to the state discrepancies of the residences 
of the parties, the Husband residing and domiciling 
in Utah, and the Wife residing and domiciling in 
Colorado, and because of the current desires of the 
minor children of the parties, and the desire of 
the parents to alleviate the emotional trauma of 
divorce with the children, the parents agree to 
exercise joint custody over said minor children. 
Provided, however, that until such time as the 
parties should agree otherwise, or until further 
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order of this Court, the Wife shall have the 
physical care, custody and control of Stephen 
Michael Larner and Joseph Scott Larner, and the 
Hu~band shall have the physical care, custody 
and control of Julianne Michelle Larner. 
(T . R. pp . 7 - 8) 
Each non-custodial parent of the children 
of the parties shall be entitled to a minimum of 
twelve (12) non-specified days each month visitation 
privileges. Provided, however, that all costs of 
transportation to and from the non-custodial parent 
shall be borne by that parent. And provided further, 
however,·that the non-custodial parent notify the 
custodial parent forty-eight (48) hours prior to the 
exercise of visitation as to the intent of the 
visitation. The parties further agree and recognize 
that the minor children would benefit greatly from 
each other's presence and the parents agree to_ 
make all reasonable efforts to insure that all-_ 
three (3) minor children are together on their-
respective birthdays, on major holidays, and during 
periods of school vacation periods (including the 
summer months). The non=custodial parent shall 
have the right to take the minor children out of 
state, or out of the country during visitation 
periods, so long as the custodial parent has been 
properly notified, and a basic itinerary of said 
trip has been furnished the custodial parent. At 
no time shall either parent exercise visitation 
which shall hinder the education of the minor 
children of the parties. (T.R. p. 8) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ANY DEFECTS IN NOTICE DID NOT DEPRIVE 
THE COURT OF JURISDICTION 
The Defendant alleges that the hearing upon the 
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Plaintiff's Motion for a Temporary order was improper in 
that there was not ten days notice given under the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (U.C.A. §78-45c-5, 1953), and 
there was not eight days notice given under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure (Rule 6(d) & 6(e)). The Defendant 
further objects that a motion seeking a temporary order 
should have been on the trial calendar and not on the order 
to show cause calendar pursuant to Local Rule 4(h) of the 
Third Judicial District Court. 
These objections do not go to the jurisdiction of 
the Court, but are minor procedural matters. 
On July 13, 1981 the Defendant, Mary Lynn Hill 
formerly Larner, was personally served with the Plaintiff's 
Complaint and Summons. (T.R. p. 22) That Complaint in part 
requested that the Third Judicial District Court "issue a 
temporary order granting full custody of the three minor 
children to the Plaintiff during the pendency of this action, 
subject to the reasonable visitation rights of the Defendant 
as provided in the original Decree." (T.R. p. 4) 
On July 13, 1981 the Defendant was personally 
served with an Order to Show 'Cause (T.R. p. 20) directing 
her to appear before the Third District Court on July 23, 
1981 to consider the Plaintiff's request for an order granting 
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temporary custody of the three minor children to the Plaintiff 
during the pendency of the action. 
The Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause was dismissed 
on July 23, 1981 at the insistence of the Defendant's counsel 
because the Defendant had not received ten (10) days notice 
of that hearing pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45c-5 (1953 as amended). 
(T.R. pp. 27-28). 
Defendant's counsel was mailed notice on August J ,-
1981 that a hearing was to be held on August 25, 1981 on the 
Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause seeking temporary custody. 
(T.R. p. 29) That notice was also mailed to the Defendant 
in Colorado on August 3, 1981. (T.R. p. 29) 
On August 19, 1981 the Plaintiff filed a Motion 
for Temporary Order seeking custody of the three mino·r 
children. (T.R. pp. 30-31) That Motion sought the same 
temporary relief as Plaintiff sought in the Complaint and in 
the Order to Show Cause. Notice of the hearing on the 
Motion for Temporary Custody was also mailed to Defendant's 
Counsel on August 19, 1981. (T.R. pp. 30-31) Defendant and 
her counsel appeared on August 25, 1981. ·(T. R. p. 98) 
Clearly the Defendant and her counsel ha.d actual notice of 
the matter of temporary custody being brought before the 
Court on August 25, 1981 in compliance with U.C.A., §78-
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45c-5(1) 1953. The focus of that section is on notice in a 
manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice. 
This Court has previously ruled that the time 
limits of Rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are 
not cast in stone but may be dispensed with in appropriate 
cases. 
Plaintiff was entitled to a fair notice and an 
effective opportunity to controvert any facts adduced 
in support of defendant's motion. The five-day 
provision of Rule 6(d), U.R.C.P. is not a hard and 
fast rule, and the trial court may dispense with 
technical compliance thereof if there be satisfactory 
proof that a party had actual notice and time to prepare 
to meet the questions raised by the motion of an 
adversary. 
Jensen v. Eames, 519 P.2d 236, 238, citing Marshal 
Durbin Farms, Inc. v. National Farmers Organization, 
Inc. (CA 5th, 1971), 445 F.2d 353, 358. 
See also, Herron v. Herron, 255 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 
1958). 
The Appellant makes no claim that she was in any 
way prejudiced by the inadequacy of time to prepare. Any 
such prejudice is not apparent from the record which indicates 
that the Appellant knew for six and a half weeks prior to 
the hearing that the Respondent sought an order granting him 
temporary custody. 
Matters of child custody to be heard under the 
Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (U.C.A. §78-45c-
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24, 1953) are to be given calendar priority and handled 
expeditiously. 
The Appellant cites Rule 4 of the Local Rules of 
the Third Judicial District Court, effective July 1, 1981 
for the proposition that the Order to Show Cause calendar 
may be used only for enforcement purposes, and claims that a 
motion seeking a temporary custody ox·cer should have been on 
the trial calendar. 
The Appellant is in error as to the usage of 
Orders to Show Cause on the Domestic Relations calendar of 
the Salt Lake County Third Judicial District Court. Orders 
to Show Cause are routinely used to secure temporary orders 
·:.in domestic relations matters for temporary custody, temporary .. 
child support and alimony, restraining orders, etc. Those 
are not enforcement matters, but prospective temporary 
relief. The Order to Show Cause calendar is the domestic 
relations law and motion calendar. Under the Appellant's 
interpretation of Local Rule 4, litigants would be precluded 
from using the Order to Show Cause calendar to secure temporary 
relief in pending divorce actions. 
The Plaintiff had set a trial date on the Complaint 
for a full hearing on its merits for December 9, 1981 but 
sought temporary relief by way of a custody order pending 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-14-
that hearing and trial. The only available forum was the 
Domestic Relations Law and Motion and Order to Show Cause 
calendar. 1 
Any errors of the Court below with regard to the 
notice given or the court calendar are minor procedural 
matters which do not go to the question of jurisdiction. 
Those are harmless errors and are not errors that this Court 
should review unless prejudice resulted. This Court granted 
Appellant's petition for an interlocutory appeal to consider 
a question regarding jurisdiction, not minor technical 
proedural errors. 
The Appellant had sufficient notice of the proceedings 
and the temporary relief sought by the Plaintiff such that 
the Appellant cannot claim any prejudice or denial of due 
process. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide: 
No error ... or defect in any ruling or order or 
in anything done ·or omitted by the court or by 
any of the parties, is ground for granting a 
1The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure make no provision for orders 
to show cause; although used thoughcut the state court system, 
orders to show cause appear to have developed and are used 
differently in each judicial district. Local Rule 4 of the 
Third District Court is an attempt to give some direction and 
regulate the use of orders to show cause in domestic relations 
matters in that district. Respondent's counsel would urge this 
Court to consider adopting uniform state rules for the use and 
issuance of orders to show cause. 
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new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment or 
order, unless refusal to take such action appears 
to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. 
The court at every stage of the proceeding must 
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which 
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. (Rule 61) 
The Appellant makes no claim that the conduct of 
the Court below in hearing the matter when and how it did 
was "inconsistent with substantial justice" nor tha.t it 
affected "the substantial rights of the parties." 
The burden is on the Appellant to show that the 
error was prejudicial to her case. Burton v. Z.C.M.I., 249 
P.2d 514, 518 (1952); see also, Bell vs. Swift & Co., 283 
F.2d 407, 408 (5th Cir. 1960). 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in 
considering the question of harmless error: 
A lawsuit is not so rule-bound that one side wins 
whenever the other side breaks a rule. To succeed 
in an appeal based on an infraction of the rules, 
the appellant must show that the infraction was 
a substantial error prejudicing the appellant's 
case. 
Bell v. Swift & Co., 283 F.2d 407, 408 (1960) 
The Appellant has neither alleged nor shown any 
prejudice resulting from the notice or calendar problem, and 
both claims should be dismissed as harmless error. 
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POINT II 
APPELLANT PRESENTED NO FACTS 
OR EVIDENCE TO THE COURT BELOW 
The Appellant alleges that the Court below acted 
based "on minimal facts" making a "precipitous decision." 
When the Court ruled upon the Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary 
Custody and upon the Defendant's Motion to Object to Jurisdiction 
the only evidence before the Court was the Verified Complaint 
of the Plaintiff. 
The Appellant had been personally served with a 
copy of the verified Complaint on July 13, 1981 and had 
ample opportunity prior to the August 25th and October 1st 
hearings to respond with evidence but chose not to do so. 
After the Court made its oral ruling during the 
hearing of October 1, 1981 counsel for the Appellant then 
requested that the Court withhold a ruling and allow him to 
submit evidence by way of an affidavit. At the time the 
Appellant's Motion to Object to Jurisdiction had been pending 
more than two months (T.R. p. 25); the court declined to 
allow the submission of additional evidence after it had 
already made its ruling. (T.R. p. 125) 
The Appellant claims that the Court below acted 
precipitously and on minimal facts in deciding that the Utah 
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court had jurisdiction over the two older minor children. 
That same decision included a determination that the Utah 
court did not have jurisdiction over the youngest child, 
Joseph Scott. The facts were obviously sufficient and the 
decision non-precipitous with regard to that child for we d 
not hear the Appellant complain about the decision to decline 
jurisdiction. 
The Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
provides for expedited hearings when there is a question of 
jurisdiction (U.C.A. §78-45c-24, 1953 as amended). Rather 
_ than expediting matters and resolving the issue of jurisdiction, 
however 1 the Appellant did not request a hearing in the 
- Court below on her Motion to Object to Jurisdiction. The 
_matter was heard only upon the insistence of the-Plaintiff's 
counsel. (T.R. p. 33) 
The Appellant objected to jurisdiction but failed 
to present any evidence with regard to jurisdiction and 
failed to notice her objection for hearing before the Court. 
It appears that the Motion to Object to Jurisdiction was 
interposed for the purpose of delaying the filing of an 
answer to allow the appellant to commence a second action in 
Colorado and not to seriously challenge the jurisdiction of 
the Court. 
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POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT ACTED WITHIN THE PURPOSE 
AND POLICY, LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE UTAH 
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT 
The Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 
(hereinafter called the "UUCCJA" or the "Act"), U.C.A. §78-
45c-14, (1953) provides as follows: 
"(l) If a court of anothe'!:' state has 
made a custody decree, a court of this state shall 
not modify that decree, unless (a) it appears to 
the court of this state that the court which 
rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction 
under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially 
in accordance with this act or has declined to assume 
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the 
court of this state has jurisdiction." (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
The threshold question is, "Did it appear to the 
Court below that the Colorado court did not have jurisdiction 
under the jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in 
accordance with the UUCCJA?" If it appeared Colorado had 
jurisdiction, then the mandatory langue.ge of U.C.A. §78-45c-
14 (1953) applies; but if it appeared that Colorado did not 
have jurisdiction under those jurisdictional prerequisites, 
then the Third Judicial District Court was proper and correct 
in taking jurisdiction. 
What are the "jurisdictional prerequisites substantially 
in accordance with this act" such the.t Colorado no longer 
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has jurisdiction and Utah has jurisdiction? We must look to 
the applicable sections of the act: 
(1) A court of this state which is competent to decide 
child custody matters has jurisdiction to make a 
child custody determination by initial or modification 
decree if the conditions as set forth in any of the 
following paragraphs are met: 
(a) This state (i) is the home state of the child 
at the time of commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) 
had been the child's home state within six months 
before commencement of the proceeding. . . 
(b) If it is in the best interest of the child 
that a court of this state assume jurisdiction because 
(i) the child and his parents, or the child and at 
least one contestant, have a significant connection 
with this state, and (ii) there is available in this 
state substantial evidence concering the child's present 
or future care, protection, training, and personal 
relationships. 
U.C.A. §78-45c-3 (1953) 
The term "home state" as used in the foregoing section is 
defined as: 
the state in which the child itmnediately preceding 
the time involved lived with tis parents, a parent 
or a person acting as parent, for at least six 
consecutive months. . . U. C .·A. §78-45c-2 (5) 1953. 
Did the Colorado court in July or August 1981 have the 
jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance 
with the Utah Statute? The evidence presented to the trial 
court clearly shows that Judge Baldwin properly ruled that 
Colorado did not retain jurisdiction. 
Utah was the "home state" for Stephen Michael and 
Julianne Michelle; they had lived in Utah for more tha.n the 
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required six months, actually more than one year. (T.R. pp. 
2-3) Colorado was not their "home state". Thus, Colorado 
did not have jurisdiction over the two oldest children under 
Subsection (a) of U.C.A. 78-45c-3 (1) (1953). 
Neither did Colorado have jurisdiction over the 
two older children under Subsection (b) of that statute. In 
their comments to the equivalent provision in the Uniform 
Act, the Uniform Law Commissioners stated: 
[This provision] perhaps more than any other provision 
of the Act requires that it be interpreted in the 
spirit of the legislative purposes expressed in section 
1. 
9 U.L.A. §3, Commissioners' Notes, at 124 (1979) 
Section 1 was enacted in Utah as U.C.A. §78-45c-l (1953). 
That section states, in part, that the express purpose of 
the UUCCJA is to 
assure that litigation concerning the custody of 
a child take place ordinarily in the state with 
which the child and his family have the closest 
connection and where significant evidence 
concerning his care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships is most readily available. 
U.C.A. §78-45c-l(c) (1953 as amended) (emphasis supplied) 
The Commissioners further commented as follows: 
Jurisdiction exists only if it is in the child's 
interest, not merely the interest of convenience 
of the feuding parties, to determine custody in 
a particular state. The interest of the child 
is served when the forum has optimum access to 
relevant evidence about the child and family. The 
submission of the parties to a forum, perhaps for the 
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purposes of divorce, is not sufficient without 
additional factors establishing closer ties with 
the state. 9 U.L.A. §3, Commissioners' Notes at 
124 (1979). ' 
The facts and evidence presented to the trial court amply 
demonstrated that the two children over whom the court 
asserted jurisdiction had maximum contact with Utah and 
minimum contact with Colorado at the time of the hearing. 
The Plaintiff and the two children had been living in 
Utah for a significant period of time, over one year. The-
children were enrolled in school in Utah. The.Plaintiff's 
Complaint established that he had a new wife and home in 
Salt Lake City and that his wife was willing, able and 
anxious to help care for the minor children. (T.R. p. 3) 
. Tha Plaintiff's Complaint established that there had been a 
substantial change of circumstances of the parties. (T.R. 
p .-- 4). Those changes or a substantial number of them occurred 
in Utah. Obviously, substantial evidence concerning the 
present and future care, protection, training and personal 
relationships of the children was most readily available in 
Utah. 
The Court below ordered tha.t a custody evaluation 
be performed in Utah (T.R. p. 42). Inherent in such a 
ruling is a finding that there is substantial evidence 
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available in Utah with regard to the best interest of the 
minor children. Indeed, counsel for the Appellant asked the 
Court below to order that this Utah performed evaluation be 
used in a proceeding in Colorado regarding custody. (T.R. 
pp. 123-124) Counsel for the Appellant thus conceded that 
there was significant evidence available in Utah which was 
necessary for the proper determination of custody and the 
best interest of the minor children in conformance with the 
jurisdictional prerequisites of U.C.A. §78-45c-3(l)(b)(ii) 
(1953 as amended). 
Since the children and their father had not resided 
in Colorado for over one year, it follows that they had a 
less significant connection with that state and that there 
was far less evidence con~erning the children available in 
that state. There was no evidence countering this compelling 
inference. Indeed, the uncontrovered evidence showed that 
the Defendant intended to leave Colorado soon, thus eliminating 
any significant connection or ties with that state. 
The Appellant argues in her brief that the exercise 
of jurisdiction by the Utah court violated a policy of 
favoring the court that issued the initial decree. Under 
the UUCCJA, however, it is clear that to the extent such a 
policy exists, it applies only where the foreign court still 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-23-
retains jurisdiction as defined in the Act. Further, such a 
policy is always superceded by and must yield to the Act's 
pervasive policy of assuring that adjudications regarding 
child custody take place where the best interests of the 
child may most readily be ascertained. U.C.A. §78-45c-l(c) 
(1953); 9 U.L.A. §3, Commissioner's .Notes at 124, (1979). 
In other jurisdictions that have enacted the 
Uniform Act the cases are numerous in which courts have 
asserted jurisdiction to modify foreign child custody decrees. 
In Settle vs. Settle, 559 P.2d 962 (Ore. 1976), th~ court 
_modified a foreign decree, changing custody of the children 
to their mother stating: 
the requirement of the availablity of "·substantial 
evidence" should be understood to require optimum 
access to relevant evidence. It appears tha.t at the 
time of the commencment of the proceeding in Oregon, 
Indiana, the state from which the children had 
been absent for 18 monthsj no longer had optimum 
access to relevant evidence. Id. at 966. 
Similarly, in Slidell vs. Valentine, 298 N.W. 2d 599 (Iowa 
1980), where the child and his mother had been absent for 
three years from the state that granted custody to the 
father, the court in the "new" state modified the foreign 
decree, and granted custody to the mother. 
Whether an Iowa court has jurisdiction to 
modify an earlier out of state decree turns first 
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upon whether that court has lost or declined its 
pre-existing jurisdiction. 
i' .. k * 
One purpose of the jurisdictional provisions of 
the act is to emphasize "maximum, rather than 
minimum contact with the state." 
* 'i< i~ 
William had not lived in Florida for three years, 
and the nexus between him and the state of Florida 
falls short of the "significant connection" required 
for the Florida court to assume jurisdiction under 
that alternative. Id. at 602-604. 
See also, Grubs vs. Ross, 614 P.2d 1225 (Ore. 1980); Smith 
vs. Smith, 594 P.2d 1292 (Ore. 1979); Ellis vs. Nickerson, 
604 P.2d 518 (Wash. 1979). Indeed, many courts have declined 
to exercise jurisdiction to modify their own child custody 
decrees in favor of other states with which the children or 
the parties have established new ties. See e.g., Schlumpf 
vs. Superior Court, County of Trinity, 145 Cal. Rptr. 190 
(1978) Clark vs. Superior Court, County of Mendocino, 140 
Cal. Rptr. 709 (1977). 
Thus, the facts and evidence before the court 
below indicate that Colorado did not retain jurisdiction 
over the two older children under U.C.A 78-45c-3 (1953) to 
modify its decree. Conversely, since Utah was the ''home 
state" of these two children and they had maximum contact 
with the state of Utah, the court properly asserted its 
jurisdiction over them. There had been a substantial change 
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in circumstances and passage of time since the issuance of 
the Colorado decree. With the Defendant's own acquiescence 
and approval, the two older children severed their ties with 
the state of Colorado and established a significant connection 
with the state of Utah. 
Using the same jurisdictional prerequisites of 
the UUCCJA the court below determined that Colorado did have 
jurisdiction over the youngest minor child, Joseph Scott. 
Colorado was the home state where that child had been domiciled 
for several years; the child had been residing and attending 
school in Colorado; there was a significant connection 
between Colorado and the child; there was substantial evidence 
concerning the child's custody and care available in Colorado. 
~herefore, under U.C.A. §78-45c-3 and §78-45c-14 (1953 as 
amended) the Utah court declined jurisdiction. Neither 
party to this action has appealed that decision of the 
Court. 
Appellant makes mention in her brief of a proceeding 
pending in Colorado to modify the Decree of Dissolution and 
grant custody of all three minor children to the Appellant. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 10) That proceeding was instituted 
by the Appellant in Colorado after the Plaintiff instituted 
this action in Utah. (T.R. pp. 101-102, p. 117) Such 
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action by the Appellant is exactly what the UUCCJA seeks to 
prevent--forum shopping, multiple litigation, jurisdictional 
competition, etc. (U.C.A. §78-45c-l, 1953 as amended) 
Instead of noticing for hearing her objection to jurisdiction 
in the Court below and resolving the matter, the Appellant 
interposed the motion, delayed filing an answer and proceeded 
in Colorado. 
The UUCCJA seeks to avoid competition in matters 
of child custody jurisdiction, but the act does not countenance 
a court retaining jurisdiction when there are no longer any 
significant ties or contacts with that state. The act 
directs that the Court before assuming jurisdiction must 
examine certain factors such as where the child has lived, 
where the custodial parent has lived, where evidence is 
available regarding the child and whether there is significant 
connection between the child, the parents and that state. 
The Court below examined all of those relevant factors as 
presented by the evidence and determined that jurisdiction 
was proper in Utah; that action was in compliance with the 
letter and the spirit of the Utah Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act. 
Significant purposes of the Uniform Act are to 
promote cooperation with the court of other states to the 
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end that a custody decree is rendered in that state which 
can best decide the case in the interest of the child (U.C.A. 
§78-45c-l(b), 1953) and to assure that litigation concerning 
a child takes place in the state in which the child and his 
family have the closest connection and where significant 
evidence concerning the child is most readily available. 
(U.C.A. §78-45c-l(c), 1953) Those puposes were clearly met 
by~the decision and finding of the court below that jurisdiction 
over the two oldest children was in Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the evidence presented to the Court 
below, the Court was correct in determining that it had 
jurisdiction under the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act because the two minor children involved and their father 
the Plaintiff had a closer connection to the state of Utah, 
than to the state of Colorado, and because significant 
evidence concerning the children and their welfare was more 
readily available in Utah. Under the act there were jurisdictional 
prerequisites existant in Utah which no longer existed in 
the state of Colorado. 
The case should be remanded to the Court below to 
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proceed on its merits at a full trial and hearing on the 
Plaintiff's Complaint to modify the Colorado Decree of 
Dissolution. 
DATED this~ day of April, 1982. 
BARNARD 
for Plaintiff-Respondent 
214 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-9531 
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I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief to Joel Allred, 
500 American Savings Building, 61 South Main Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111 postage prepaid in the U.S. Postal 
Service on this~day of April, 1982. 
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